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Roberts: Dissent and Fallay in Dickerson v. United States

ESSAY
DISSENT AND FALLACY IN DICKERSON v.
UNITED STATES
Rodney C. Robertst
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Dickerson v. United States,1 the Supreme Court ruled against 18
U.S.C. § 3501, a federal statute enacted by Congress that would have
superseded the Court's ruling in Miranda v. Arizona2 "that certain
warnings must be given before a suspect's statement made during custodial interrogation could be admitted in evidence." ' 3 If Professor
Chemerinsky is correct, Dickerson "will be remembered both for its
practical significance in requiring that the police and courts continue
to follow Miranda and for its broader theoretical significance in limiting the ability of Congress to overturn such judicially created devices
for protecting constitutional rights." 4 This Essay bears upon the
broader theoretical significance of Dickerson.
In his dissent from the majority in Dickerson, Justice Scalia (joined
by Justice Thomas) argues that the Court "acts in plain violation of
the Constitution when it denies effect to this Act of Congress." 5 This
Essay aims to show that an important part of the reasoning in his dissent is fallacious, and insofar as the dissent is influenced by this reasoning, it is without value.
Because dissenting opinions generally, and those of the Supreme
Court especially, can become valuable in subsequent legal opinions
and analyses, and because logic has a clear and important role to play
in legal reasoning, it is important to recognize when fallacies occur in
dissenting Supreme Court opinions and to understand the precise nature of any such fallacy.
II.

DISSENT, LOGIC, AND THE LAW

Sound reasoning in a dissenting opinion helps to create the possibil-

ity that, at some point in the future, the dissent may be "cited and
t Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Hawai'i at Manoa. M.A.,
Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison. Thanks are due to Professors Jim Tiles,
Mary Tiles, and Eliot Deutsch for their encouragement and comments on the idea for
this Essay.
1. 120 S.Ct. 2326 (2000).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2329.
4. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Should Have Remained Silent: Why the Court
Erred in Deciding Dickerson v. United States, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 287, 288 (2000).

5. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2338 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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respected as an authority."6 Unfortunately, some may be tempted to
undervalue the importance of logic in judicial reasoning, holding to
"the old tradition [which] says that law is law, and has nothing to do
with any other field of human inquiry." 7 However, as Professor Cohen has pointed out, "it would be only the wisdom of the ostrich" that
would encourage us to spare the law from penetrating logical analysis
"when the foundations of our legal system are questioned both inside
and outside of the legal fraternity."'8 Indeed, "the effort to assume the
form of a deductive system underlies all constructive legal scholarship."9 It is important, therefore, that logical analysis be brought to
bear upon the dissent in Dickerson.
III.

SUFFICIENT AND NECESSARY CONDITIONS

Before proceeding with an analysis of the dissent, two logical concepts, which are the keys to understanding the fallacy in Justice
Scalia's argument, must be made clear. These concepts, viz., that of a
sufficient condition, and that of a necessary condition, can be taken
together.
All conditional or "if... then..." statements consist of two components: an antecedent and a consequent. 10 The former immediately follows the "if," and the latter immediately follows the "then."' 1
Conditional statements are especially important in logic because
they express the relationship between necessary and sufficient conditions. A is said to be a sufficient condition for B whenever the
occurrence of A is all that is needed for the occurrence of B ...
[and] B is said to be a necessary condition for A whenever A cannot
occur without the occurrence of B.' 2
The rules of logic hold that the statement which names the sufficient
condition be placed in the antecedent of the conditional statement,
and that the statement which names the necessary condition be placed
in the consequent.' 3
Hence, this relationship can be illustrated with the example: If X is
a woman, then X is a human being. This statement asserts that being
6. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 421 (1896).
7. Morris R. Cohen, The Place of Logic in the Law, 29 HARV. L. REV. 622, 623
(1916), reprinted in MORRIS R. COHEN, The Place of Logic in the Law, in LAW AND
THE SOCIAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

165, 166 (reprint 1994).

8. Id., reprinted in

MORRIS R. COHEN, The Place of Logic in the Law, in LAW
AND THE SOCIAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 165, 166 (reprint 1994).
9. Id. at 624, reprinted in MORRIS R. COHEN, The Place of Logic in the Law, in
LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 165, 167 (reprint

1994).
10. PATRICK

J.

HURLEY,

A

CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC

22 (7th ed. 2000).

11. Id.
12. Id. at 24.
13. Id. at 306.
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a woman is a sufficient condition for being a human being, and that
being a human being is a necessary condition for being a woman.
Alternatively, because "the statement that follows 'only if' is always
the consequent,"' 4 the same relationship can be expressed as: X is a
woman only if X is a human being. Therefore, like the first example,
this statement also asserts that being a human being is a necessary
condition for being a woman.
Having clarified what sufficient and necessary conditions are, this
Essay now proceeds to the argument in question.
IV.

THE REAL ARGUMENT

Justice Scalia opens section one of his dissent by stating that "[e]arly
in this Nation's history, this Court established the sound proposition
that constitutional government in a system of separated powers requires judges to regard as inoperative any legislative act, even of Congress itself, that is 'repugnant to the Constitution."" 5 He then quotes
the Court in Marbury v. Madison 6 as saying:
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and
the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must
either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the
constitution, or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the
law, the court17must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case.
Using "P" to indicate the premise, and "C" to indicate the conclusion, and following the rules of logic, the argument that emerges from
this quotation is:
P: "[I]f a law be in opposition to the
constitution," then the
18
Court must "disregard[ ] the law."'
C:

A law being in opposition to the Constitution is a sufficient
condition for the Court to disregard that law.
V.

THE FALLACIOUS ARGUMENT

However, immediately following the quotation from Marbury, Justice Scalia claims that "[tihe power we recognized in Marbury will
thus permit us, indeed require us, to 'disregar[d]' § 3501, a duly enacted statute governing the admissibility of evidence in the federal
courts, only if it 'be in opposition to the constitution'-here, assertedly, the dictates of the Fifth Amendment."' 19
14. Id. at 305.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2338 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Id. at 178, quoted in Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2338 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2338 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Because Justice Scalia claims that Marbury requires the Court to
"disregar[d]" § 3501 only if it is "in opposition to the constitution," he
argues thus:
P:

"[I]f a law be in opposition to the
20 constitution," then the
Court must "disregard[ ] the law."

C:

A law being in opposition to the Constitution is a necessary
condition for the Court to disregard that law.

Because the premise stated in the quotation from Marbury implies
that being in opposition to the Constitution is a sufficient condition for
the Court to disregard a law, and because Justice Scalia infers from
this premise that being in opposition to the Constitution is a necessary
condition for the Court to disregard a law, the result of his inference is
a conclusion which is not logically implied by the premise. Thus, he
commits the fallacy of missing the point.2 1

VI.

A

POSSIBLE OBJECTION

One might object to this analysis, claiming that, even if it is correct,
and Justice Scalia's reasoning is fallacious, it nevertheless has little or
no bearing on the argument he advances in the dissent. Hence, this
fallacy does little or nothing to mitigate the force of the overall argument. After all, the objector might say, the conclusion in Justice
Scalia's dissent has nothing to do with sufficient and necessary conditions; rather, it is a claim about the constitutionality of the Court's
action in Dickerson.
This objection is mistaken. Indeed, the fallacious inference is
grounds for Justice Scalia's claim of unconstitutionality. Having established, fallaciously, that being in opposition to the Constitution is a
necessary condition for the Court to disregard a law, he later claims
that "[b]y disregarding congressional action that concededly does not
violate the Constitution, the Court flagrantly offends fundamental
principles of separation of powers, and arrogates to itself prerogatives
reserved to the representatives of the people."2 2
Hence, Justice Scalia claims that, because § 3501 "concededly does
not violate the Constitution,"2 3 that is, because the fallaciously inferred necessary condition of being in opposition to the Constitution
is not met, the Court's action in Dickerson therefore "offends" the
Constitution.
20. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178.
21. HURLEY, supra note 10, at 130-31.
22. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2342 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23. Id. (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
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CONCLUSION

Because the argument advanced by Justice Scalia from Marbury is
fallacious, it advances no good reason for thinking that being in opposition to the Constitution is a necessary condition for the Court to
disregard a law. However, the fallaciousness of the argument does
provide good reason for questioning the value of the dissent in Dickerson. As Mr. Black tells us:
If the court bases its conclusions wholly or in part upon what it supposes to have been the doctrine of a former case, whereas such former case in reality decided no such thing, then, in so far as the
judgment was influenced by the mistaken conception of the former
case, it is without value.24
Because Justice Scalia's claim of unconstitutionality is grounded
upon his fallacious inference from Marbury, and because the judgment in his dissent was clearly influenced by that inference, insofar as
it was, the dissent is without value.
This Essay attempts to show only that an important part of the reasoning in the Dickerson dissent is fallacious, and, insofar as the dissent
is influenced by this reasoning, it is without value. This Essay makes
no claim regarding the constitutionality of § 3501 or regarding the Supreme Court's action in this case.
24.

BLACK,

supra note 6, at 418-19.
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